The steel ‘U’ class submarine HMS Untamed was launched from the Barrow-in-Furness yard of Vickers-Armstrong Ltd (Yard No 47) on 8th December 1942. She measured 192.2′ x 16.1′ x 15.2′ and her tonnage was 540 displacement tons on the surface, 730 displacement tons submerged. She was powered by 2 x diesel-electric engines 800 delivering brake horse power, 2 x Paxman Ricardo diesel generators with electric motors delivering 760 horse power for underwater use. She was armed with 4 bow internal 21 inch torpedo tubes (8 – 10 torpedoes) and a 3 inch deck gun.
On Sunday 30th May, 1943 Untamed was participating in anti-submarine training exercises with HMS Shemara off the south end of Kintyre close to the island of Sanda. She was commanded by Lieutentant Commander Gordon Noll who had a crew of thirty five men aboard. In the morning the first dive, lasting three hours, started just before 10:00am and passed without incident. At 13:48pm Untamed dived again for a second dive planned for a further three hours. At around 14:00 Petty Officer Welford went down to the auxiliary machine space to withdraw, examine and repair an apparent defect in the Ottway Log. Here the fatal first mistake was made. The log was protected by a sluice gate that needed to be closed before the log could be withdrawn. Despite the fact that there is an indicator to show if this valve is shut he removed the log when the sluice was still partially open. When the last securing bolt was removed the log was forced up by the pressure of water and water poured into the compartment. It was not possible to seal off this high pressure leak so the compartment was abandoned and the hatch closed to seal it off. From the evidence found later it is not 100% clear what happened next but it would appear that Welford and another seaman, Sub-Lieutenant Acworth, who was probably supervising the removal of the log, were at some point sealed behind bulkhead door number 54 as the remainder of the crew made a hurried evacuation of the front end of the submarine. In the panic to save themselves the crew did not shut the starboard bulkhead door to the torpedo tube compartment and the ventilation valves and communication cock on the bulkhead were also left open. A further problem at bulkhead door 40, which was apparently damaged during the incident, probably due to it being forced shut against some kind of floating debris, leaving it slightly buckled and therefore unable to seal. As the water finally burst out of the sealed auxiliary machine space it’s progress along the ship, as far as bulkhead 54, was unimpeded.
As the flooding proceeded various vain attempts were made to blow tanks and surface the ship but, due to the extensive flooding already described, it is unlikely that these attempts could have been successful. The enquiry again criticised the actions of the remaining crew in this period firstly by pointing out some errors in the actions carried out to try to refloat the submarine, in particular no attempt seems to have been made to immediately blow the main ballast tanks, and, more pointedly, by indicating that it took too long to recognise the impossibility of the situation and turn their attentions to an attempt to escape. It appears that the crew tried various ways to re-surface for the next three to four hours. Finally communications were lost between two separate parties of men in the control room and the crew space probably as the water reached the crew space drowning the men trapped there.
The remaining thirty four men, trapped in the engine room, after abandoning the control room area to the oncoming water and now plunged into darkness, at last turned their attentions to escape but once again fate was to play a cruel final blow as, when they tried to open the deep sea escape flap valve, it would not operate. Examination of this valve after the ship’s salvage was to reveal that although the valve was apparently in the ‘open’ position as indicated by the pointer, the lever was in actual fact assembled ninety degrees from its correct position causing the indicator to show ‘open’ when the valve was in fact shut. Why the lever was incorrectly assembled was not precisely established although records ashore did show it was inspected and found to be in good working order during the ship’s last inspection. It seems likely therefore that the lever was removed, possibly for cleaning, and incorrectly replaced by a member of the crew some time later.
The horror of the situation as the men, now wearing deep sea escape breathing apparatus, tried in vain to find other methods of flooding the remaining compartments and allowing them at least the chance of escape from the submarine and a long ascent to the surface is obvious. Finally, they too were to succumb probably overcome by carbon dioxide poisoning before the water reached the final compartments
Back on the surface there was little that the men aboard HMS Shemara and the many other ships now assembled in the area, could do. They knew that something had gone horribly wrong below and could hear the various attempts to blow tanks on their hydrophones. At 17:45pm the noises of the machinery ceased and it is assumed that, at this point, the last efforts to save the submarine itself were abandoned and the crew turned their attentions to escape. At 22:12pm air bubbles were observed on the surface which stopped three minutes later. This was the last sign of activity from the submarine.
The report of the court of enquiry held aboard HMS Wolfe is brutally precise and unfeeling about the understandable panic that would spread through the crew of a submarine trapped and flooding on the seabed. However, it is clear from the evidence that, after the initial problem that started the incident, a number of decisions were made and actions not taken or delayed that possibly could have averted some loss of life if not saved the ship.
The findings of the court of enquiry were:
1. …… loss of submarine directly attributable to the failure of the crew to take immediate, obvious and adequate steps to prevent unrestricted flooding.
2. …… failure to escape can also be attributed to poor drill, ignorance and lack of leadership.
3…….. efforts to save the submarine were continued long after it should have been clear that such efforts were futile.
While the findings of the enquiry were no doubt accurate it is also understandable that the terrible situation the crew found themselves in resulted in some mistakes. In the end the men themselves paid the ultimate price for these errors. In one small last mitigation of the situation the enquiry reports comments that the errors “must be partially attributable to the comparatively short time which can now be devoted to training and the consequent inexperience of submarine crews.”
The submarine itself, raised on 5th July, was eventually re-fitted and re-named Vitality and returned to service, completing the war safely. She was sold at the end of the war for scrap and broken up at Troon in March 1946.